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I Comments

I

Pennsylvania's Right-to-Farm Law: A
Relief for Farmers or an Unconstitutional
Taking?
Jennifer L.Beidel*
I.

Introduction

Agriculture is Pennsylvania's largest industry.' It produces over
forty-four billion dollars in annual revenue and provides approximately
one in six of Pennsylvania's jobs.2 In spite of the economic importance
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006.
1. Dennis Wolff, Governor's Proposal Criticalfor Preserving PA's Farmland,
CapNews, http://www.nichenews.com/c/guestspeakers/dwolff.html (last visited May 30,
2005). In 2002, the total value of farm production in the state exceeded $2.1 billion, and
the farming sector of the economy provided more than 84,300 jobs. AgImpacts: The Role
of Production Agriculture in the Local Economy, Pennsylvania State University,
http://agimpact.aers.psu.edu (last visited May 30, 2005). Many of Pennsylvania's
agriculture sectors are among the largest in the nation. Pennsylvania Agricultural
Information, Pennsylvania Farm Bureau, http://www.pfb.com/news/aginfo.html (last
visited May 30, 2005). For example, Pennsylvania ranks first in the nation in mushroom
production and fourth in dairy production. Id. The state also ranks first in the production
of many snack foods, including potato chips, pretzels, and processed chocolate. Id.
2. American
Farmland
Trust,
http://www.farmland.org/midatlantic/
Pennsylvania.htm (last visited May 30, 2005).
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of the agriculture industry, its viability is becoming increasingly
threatened by urban sprawl,3 which engulfs over 1.2 million acres of
America's farmland per year.4 In addition, urban sprawl brings with it
new landowners who are unaccustomed to country life and are largely
unwilling to deal with its shortcomings.5
Right-to-farm laws, which have been enacted in all fifty states, 6 are
one piece of a larger puzzle of statutes designed to preserve land for
agricultural use and to remedy conflicts between farmers and their nonfarm neighbors. 7 Specifically, right-to-farm laws are intended to
8
preserve agricultural operations by protecting them from nuisance suits.
Nuisance suits can be particularly damaging to farm operations because
the time and money required to defend such actions may force farmers to
3. Urban sprawl is defined as "development that is inefficient use of land (i.e., low
density); constructed in a 'leap frog' manner in areas without existing infrastructure,
often on prime farmland, automobile dependent, and consisting of isolated single use
neighborhoods requiring excessive transportation." In re Dolington Land Group, 839
A.2d 1021, 1029 n.8 (Pa. 2003).
4. Alan Gregory, Who Bought the Farm?, THE STANDARD SPEAKER, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3765154/ (last visited May 30, 2005). In the fifteen years
from 1982 to 1997, Pennsylvania lost over 10,000 farms and over 1,000,000 acres, or
13%, of its agricultural land. Id. Furthermore, in the five years from 1997 to 2002,
Pennsylvania lost another 2,000 farms. See 2002 Census of Agriculture, U.S.D.A. Nat'l
Agricultural
Statistics
Serv.,
Pa. State
Data-Table
1, available at
http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/ (last visited May 30, 2005).
5. The sounds of tractors and animals in the early morning, the smell of freshly
fertilized fields, and the dirt and dust associated with farming often irritate non-farm
neighbors. See, e.g., Kent Fleming, Farming in the Shadow of the City, in 1989
YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE: FARM MANAGEMENT 308, 322-24 (Deborah T. Smith ed.,
1989).
6. See
Farmland
Information
Center,
http://www.farmlandinfo.org/
farmlandpreservation laws/ (last visited May 30, 2005) (database which provides links
to the text of the right-to-farm laws of all fifty states).
7. Other methods currently used to preserve Pennsylvania farmland include the
Purchase of Agricultural Conservation Easement (PACE) Program, which provides for
the purchase of development rights for farmland in order to preserve its agricultural use,
3 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 914.1-914.5 (West 2005), and the Agricultural Security Area Act,
which protects areas of viable agricultural land that are greater than 250 acres. 3 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 901-913 (West 2005). In addition, a new program created by the
administration of Governor Edward Rendell will invest a portion of an appropriation
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars to preserve farmland and protect open
space. See Welcome to the Growing Greener Program, Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection, http://www.dep.state.pa.us/growgreen/ (last visited May 30,
2005). See also Pennsylvania Statutory andRegulatory Measures to ProtectAgricultural
Land and Open Space, Pennsylvania General Assembly Local Government Commission,
http://www.lgc.state.pa.us/deskbook03/Issues22.pdf (last visited May 30, 2005) (gives
brief descriptions of over seventeen state programs intended to help preserve the state's
agricultural land and operations).
8. Nuisance laws have been used to challenge agricultural practices since as early
as 1610. Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Reports 816 (1610) (emission of odor from livestock
was alleged to be a nuisance).
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sell all or part of their land.9 In addition, since odors and noise are a
natural part of any farm operation, it can be difficult for even the most
diligent of managers to eliminate nuisances entirely. Nevertheless,
liability can attach even after a farmer has acted reasonably to prevent
the nuisance.10 Therefore, without right-to-farm laws, it would become
almost impossible for agricultural operations to exist in suburban areas,
where the number of neighboring property owners increases the
probability of nuisance suits.
Furthermore, as farms increase in size, they become more prone to
challenge by non-agricultural neighbors. 1 In recent years, economies of
scale' 2 have driven the expansion of farm operations in a variety of
agricultural sectors.' 3 With this expansion has come an increase in the
number of nuisance suits.14
In the two decades since right-to-farm laws have been implemented
nationwide, they have consistently withstood legal challenges. 15
9. Although most farmers are well-off in terms of capital assets, their businesses
typically lack the cash flow required to defend a lengthy lawsuit. DALE M. JOHNSON ET
AL., ASSESSING AND IMPROVING YOUR FARM CASH FLOW 7 (1998).
10. If a nuisance exists, the person responsible for it is strictly liable for the resulting
damages even if he acted reasonably "to prevent or minimize the deleterious effect of the
nuisance." Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Iowa 1942). In other
words, a nuisance can exist even without a finding of negligence. Id.
11. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972)
(nuisance suit brought against large cattle feedlot); Laux v. Chopin Land Ass'n, 615
N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (nuisance suit brought against large hog facility).
12. The term "economies of scale" refers to the advantage that large businesses have
over their smaller competitors because of their ability to reduce costs and increase profits.
RONALD D. KNUTSON ET AL., AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD POLICY 226 (4th ed. 1998).

Focusing on agriculture, there are three economies of scale that favor large operations
and often drive farmers to expand. Id. First, a larger farm operation's average cost of
production is typically lower than that of a smaller farm because the larger farm's input
costs can be spread over a greater amount of output. Id. at 227. Second, a larger farm
operation may be able to negotiate a lower price for farm inputs or a higher price for farm
outputs, solely because of its large size. Id. at 228. Third, large farms are often more
likely to benefit from technological advances because of their increased ability to afford
new technology. Id.
13. Between 1997 and 2002, the number of dairy and beef farms with less than 499
head of cattle decreased by 15%, from 33,051 to 27,957. See 2002 Census of
Agriculture, U.S.D.A. Nat'l Agricultural Statistics Serv., Pa. State Data-Table 12,
available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/ (last visited May 30, 2005). During
the same time period, the number of dairy and beef farms with between 500 and 5,000
head of cattle increased by 30%. Id. Other agricultural industries experienced similar
trends. For example, the number of hog farms with less than 1,000 head decreased by
14%, while the number with over 1,000 head increased by 7%. Id. at Table 19.
14. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972)
(nuisance suit brought against large cattle feedlot); Laux v. Chopin Land Ass'n, 615
N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (nuisance suit brought against large hog facility).
15. Steven J. Laurent, Michigan's Right to Farm Act: Have Revisions Gone Too
Far?, 2002 MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. REV. 213, 228 (2002) [hereinafter Laurent,

Michigan's Right to Farm].
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However, this impeccable track record was interrupted by a 1998
decision in which the Iowa Supreme Court struck down that state's rightto-farm statute as unconstitutional. 16 Subsequently, challenges arose in
several other states. 17
This Comment discusses the implications of these constitutional
challenges on Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law 18 and offers suggestions
for changes in the law that might make it less vulnerable to constitutional
attack. Part II explains the fundamental principles of nuisance law. It
also summarizes the policy concerns that led to the adoption of
Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law and to its subsequent amendments.
Part 111-A describes the substantive distinctions between Pennsylvania's
These distinctions could help to insulate
law and Iowa's law.
Pennsylvania's law from constitutional challenge. Part Ill-B critiques
the reasoning behind Iowa's finding of unconstitutionality and proffers
reasons why Pennsylvania courts may differ in their approach. Part IV
concludes.
II.
A.

Background
Nuisance Law Explained

The common law of nuisance forbids individuals from using their
property in a way that "unreasonably interferes" with another's use or
enjoyment of his land. 19 Nuisance claims are highly fact-specific, so
there are no bright-line rules to determine when conduct will amount to a
nuisance. 20 However, a common test for determining the existence of a
nuisance weighs the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility
of the defendant's use. 2 1 The paramount question in determining if a
16. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
17. In Washington, a challenge was raised by Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd.
P'ship, 952 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1998). The court held that the Washington right-to-farm
law insulated farmers from nuisance suits only when the suits arose from urban
encroachment. Id. at 614. The portion of the law that purported to do more than codify
the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine was struck down. Id. at 616. In Texas, a challenge
was raised by Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. Accord Agric., Inc., No. 9600159, 1999 WL 699825 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1999). However, the plaintiff's
challenge to Texas's right-to-farm law was dismissed on standing grounds due to lack of
injury on the part of the plaintiff. Id. at *5.
18. Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law is found in 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-957
(West 2005).
19. DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 10 (4th ed.
1994).
20.

(2005).
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21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827-828 (1979). To determine the
plaintiff s harm, the following factors are considered: (1) the extent and character of the
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for the defendant to be doing
nuisance exists is "whether it is reasonable
22
what it is doing where it is doing it."
There are two types of nuisances: public and private.23 A public
nuisance interferes with the rights of a community at large. 24
Conversely, a private nuisance interferes with an individual's use and
enjoyment of his land.2 5 Unlike trespass, which involves an actual
physical invasion of property, a private nuisance typically involves the
invasion of a property by an intangible substance, such as noises or
odors.26 Therefore, the extent to which others are affected by a nuisance
determines whether it is public or private.27
Nuisance cases in many states 28 are guided by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts's definition of nuisance. 29 Based on this definition,
many prosperous agricultural operations were deemed nuisances prior to
30
the advent of right-to-farm laws. For example, in Pendoley v. Ferreira,

harm; (2) the social value of the use invaded; and (3) the burden on the plaintiff of
avoiding the harm. Id. To determine the utility of the defendant's use, the following
factors are considered: (1) the social value of the use; (2) the impracticality of avoiding
the nuisance-like conduct; and (3) the suitability of the use to the area. Id. Pennsylvania
defines a nuisance as "a class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarrantable,
or unlawful use by a person of his own property... to the right of another, or the public,
producing such material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or hurt that the law will
presume a consequential damage." Feeley v. Borough of Ridley Park, 551 A.2d 373, 375
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
22. CALLIES, supra note 19, at 10.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Public nuisances may threaten the public health, safety or welfare, or damage
community resources, such as public water supplies or roads. Commonwealth v.
MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290, 301 (Pa. 1975).
25. Guzman v. Des Moines Hotel Partners, 489 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 1992).
26. Golen v. Union Corp., 718 A.2d 298, 300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
27. In Pennsylvania, the distinction between public and private nuisances is no
longer relevant for right-to-farm cases. See Home v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954, 957-58 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law applies with equal force
to public and private nuisance claims).
28. The Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts's
definition of private nuisance in 1984. Kembel v. Schlegel, 478 A.2d 11, 14 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1984).
29. For example, section 822 of the Restatement, which helps to define nuisance and
has guided numerous courts, provides:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a
legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment
of land, and the invasion is either:
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous
conditions or activities.
Kirpiak v. Russo, 676 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977)).
30. Pendoley v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 142 (Mass. 1963).
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a farmer started a hog farm in a rural community in 1949.31 His business
prospered, and the number of hogs increased.32 The farm was operated
in compliance with state law, and there was no negligence on the part of
the farmer; however, the farm smelled nonetheless.33 Over the years,
development spread toward the farm, and, in 1960, a small neighborhood
was constructed nearby.3 4 The farmer's new neighbors, bothered by the
smell, brought a nuisance suit against him. 35 Ultimately, the court held
that the farmer was creating a nuisance, despite his reasonable efforts to
control the smell, and ordered him to liquidate his business.36
Even in cases where nuisance lawsuits ultimately failed, the cost of
defending against the suits often threatened farming operations or even
forced them to close. 37 This, among other factors, led to the widespread
adoption of right-to-farm laws across the country between 1978 and
1983.38
B. Reasons for the Adoption ofPennsylvania'sRight-to-Farm Law
First enacted in 1982, 3 9 Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law was
designed to protect farmland threatened by non-farm development.4 °
When adopting the law, the legislature declared that when non-farm
development extends into agricultural areas, agricultural operations are
often subjected to nuisance suits and are "sometimes forced to cease
operations. ' 41 Even those farmers that are not forced to close down may
be discouraged from investing in farm improvements, as they may be
uncertain as to whether those improvements will subject them to

31. Id. at 144.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 143.
36. Id. at 146.
37. Janie Hipp, Right-to-FarmLaws: Historyand Future, National Agricultural Law
Center 1, available at http://www.farmfoundation.org/1998NPPEC/hipp.pdf (last visited
May 30, 2005).
38. This period saw the methodical elimination of farmland as urban areas began to
expand into traditionally rural land. Alexander A. Reinert, The Right to Farm:Hog-Tied
and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1694, 1697 (1998). The 1977 publication of the
National Agricultural Lands Study, which warned of a national crisis created by the loss
of farmland and recommended that states enact right-to-farm laws, had a marked
influence on lawmakers in many states. Id. at 1696-97.
39. See Act of June 10, 1982, Pub. L. No. 454, No. 133.
40. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 (West 2005). The legislature's objective
when adopting the right-to-farm law was "to conserve and protect and encourage the
development and improvement of its agricultural land for the production of food and
other agricultural products." Id.
41. See id.
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nuisance liability.42
A second motivating factor behind the passage of Pennsylvania's
right-to-farm law was the dwindling utility of the common law's
"coming to the nuisance" doctrine.4 3 This doctrine, which is generally
based on the theory of assumption of risk,44 creates a defense to a
nuisance claim for a plaintiff whose alleged nuisance-like conduct
existed before the defendant moved into the area of the conduct. 45 The
"coming to the nuisance" defense states that the first landowner to arrive
in an area has certain rights to use the land regardless of the uses of later
neighboring landowners. 46 For example, a property owner who builds a
residence next to an established hog farm is deemed to have assumed the
risk that the hog farm may produce unpleasant odors and noises, and the
farmer is permitted to continue
to use the land regardless of the effect on
47
the neighbor's residence
Although this example illustrates the most desirable result of the
"coming to the nuisance" doctrine, the doctrine is not always so
effective. In Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Company,4 8
Spur Industries had successfully operated a cattle feedlot in a rural area
for many years. 49 Gradually, urban sprawl crept into the area, and
eventually a residential community was located on land adjacent to the
feedlot. ° In response to the developer's claim against the feedlot
operator, the court recognized that the developer had come to the
nuisance. 51 Nevertheless, the court found in favor of the developer and
closed down the feedlot.
The outcome of this case illustrates the
42. See id. In most states, including Pennsylvania, zoning laws often allow for
agricultural activity, but provide no definitive regulations, such as emission control
standards. J. Patrick Wheeler, Livestock Odor & Nuisance Actions vs. "Right-to-Farm"
Laws: Report By Defendant Farmer'sAttorney, 68 N.D. L. REv. 459, 460-61 (1992).
This leaves agricultural operators with little guidance regarding which activities may be
deemed a nuisance. Id.
43. The continuing utility of the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine is frequently
debated. See, e.g., GREGORY, KALVERE & EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
616, 677-81 (1977).
44. Assumption of risk is a principle of tort law that "one who has taken on oneself
the risk of loss, injury, or damage consequently cannot maintain an action against the

party having caused the loss."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

121 (7th ed. 1999).

45. See GREGORY, KALVERE & EPSTEIN, at 677-81.
46. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972).
47. For an illustration of how the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine was traditionally
applied, see, e.g., Feldstein v. Kammauf, 121 A.2d 716, 721 (Md. 1956) (denying relief
to plaintiffs who "knew or should have known" of existence of nuisance prior to
moving).
48. Spur, 494 P.2d at 700.
49. Id. at 703-04.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 706.
52. Id. The court also required the developer to pay the costs of moving the
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judiciary's decreasing willingness to enforce the "coming to the
nuisance" doctrine.5 3 Some courts entirely refuse to recognize the
defense.
Currently, "coming to the nuisance" is54 seen as only one of many
factors in a nuisance action. 55 First in time is no longer absolutely first in
right. 56 Consequently, right-to-farm laws fill the void and return the
protection afforded by the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine in earlier
times.57
C. The Operationof Pennsylvania'sRight-to-FarmLaw
The Pennsylvania right-to-farm law provides agricultural operations
with immunity from nuisance suit if certain conditions are met.58 To
qualify for immunity from suit, an agricultural operation must have
lawfully been in existence for more than one year prior to the
commencement of a nuisance action.59 In addition, the conditions upon
which the nuisance suit is based must be "normal agricultural
operations" 60 and must have "existed substantially unchanged since the
established date of operation. 61
Even if the physical facilities of an agricultural operation are
"substantially expanded or substantially altered," the operation is
plaintiff's feedlot to a new location. Id. at 708.
53.

JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND

CONTROL LAW § 14.4, at 640 (1998).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Abdella v. Smith, 149 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Wis. 1967) ("A plaintiff, of
course is not ipso facto barred from relief in the courts merely because of coming to the
nuisance") (citations omitted).
56. "First in time, first in right" is a common law concept that was used to determine
which of two claimants had rightful title to a parcel of land. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Records and
Recording Laws § 39 (2004). Since there was no system for registration of land at
common law, the first person to claim the land prevailed. Id. Despite the adoption of an
elaborate system of land registration, the concept has remained a pervasive part of
property law and is used to resolve disputes in many contexts. Id.
57.

ROGER A. MCEOWEN & NEIL E. HARL, PRINCIPLES OF AGRICULTURAL LAW 11-49

(2005) (discussing the wane in the utility of the "coming to the nuisance" defense and the
corresponding growth in right-to-farm laws).
58. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954(a) (West 2005).
59. Id. This essentially codifies the common law "coming to the nuisance" doctrine.
See supra Part I-B.
60. 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 952 (West 2005). A normal agricultural operation
includes the "activities, practices, equipment and procedures" that farmers use in the
production of "poultry, livestock and their products" and in the production of
"agricultural, agronomic, horticultural, silvicultural and aquacultural crops and
commodities." Id. § 952. Furthermore, a normal agricultural operation must be greater
than ten contiguous acres in area or, if it is less than ten contiguous acres, must have an
estimated yearly gross income of greater than $10,000. Id.
61. Id. &954(a).
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immune from suit as long as the altered facility has been in operation for
at least one year. 62 This leaves farmers vulnerable to nuisance suits for
the one-year period after any substantial change 63 in their operation,
which may deter them from expanding or investing in improvements.
Despite the right-to-farm law's protectionist purpose, it does not
completely strip neighbors of their rights to bring nuisance suits against
farmers. 64 Instead, neighbors are permitted to file suit as long as they do
so within the one-year statutory period. 65 In addition, the right-to-farm
law does not circumvent the right to recover damages for any injuries
66
that result from the acts of an agricultural operation that violate the law
or result in a flood or the pollution of a stream. 6 7 Finally, the right-tofarm law does not interfere with the neighbors' ability to file suit against
a farm under a theory other than nuisance. 68
Beyond immunity from suit, the right-to-farm law also seeks to
prevent local governments from infringing on agricultural operations.69
The law limits the ability of municipalities to create local ordinances that
define "normal agricultural operations" as public nuisances. 70 The rightto-farm law also contains a severability provision that would save the
remainder of the law should any portion be invalidated.71
D. Reasonsfor the Amendment of Pennsylvania'sRight-to-FarmLaw
In 1998,72 Pennsylvania amended its right-to-farm law to -provide
further protection to farmers.73 A portion of the amendment was
designed to immunize farmers who sought to expand or substantially
change their operations from nuisance suits. 7 4 Because the original law's
one-year statutory period created a deterrent to investment, the
62. Id.
63. The right-to-farm law does not define what constitutes a "substantial change,"
which may leave a farmer guessing as to when his actions will make his vulnerable to
suit.
64. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954(a) (West 2005).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 954(b).
67. Id. § 955.
68. Id. § 956. For instance, trespass and other tort actions are available alternatives.
See, e.g., City of Benton v. Adrian, 748 P.2d 679, 685 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (permitting
a claim of trespass as an alternative to a nuisance claim).
69. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 953(a) (West 2005).
70. See id.
Municipalities are called upon to "encourage the continuity,
development and viability of agricultural operations" within their jurisdictions. Id.
71. Id. § 957.
72. See Act ofMay 15,1998, Pub. L. No. 441, No. 58, § 2.
73. According to the original version of the bill introduced in the Senate, the
legislative purpose behind the amendment was to further provide for "limitation on public
nuisances." S.B. 682, 182nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1997).
74. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954 (West 2005).
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amendment sought to give farmers a way to opt out of the problematic
one-year period.75 Since the amendment, a farmer may avoid the oneyear period by developing a nutrient management plan76 in compliance
with state law prior to substantially changing his operation.77 As such,
the farmer is provided with immediate immunity from suit and the
deterrent to investment is removed.
Given the benefits of nutrient management plans to the
environment, this amendment is beneficial not only to farmers but also to
the community. It was part of a far-reaching legislative plan to
encourage the voluntary development of nutrient management plans and
to decrease the deleterious effects of improperly handled manure on the
environment.78
III.
A.

Analysis
Substantive Distinctionsbetween Different Types of Right-to-Farm
Laws

In order to be effective, right-to-farm laws require a "reallocation of
property ' 79 interests between a farmer and his non-agricultural
neighbors. When a right-to-farm law is enacted, some conduct that
previously would have constituted a nuisance becomes protected by
statute. 80 This may prompt concerns from non-agricultural property
owners that their legal rights to enjoy their properties have been
infringed. 8' To counter these concerns, many states' right-to-farm laws
75. Id.
76. Id. § 1703. A nutrient management plan is a "written site-specific plan [that]
incorporates best management practices to manage the use of plant nutrients for crop
production and water quality protection" consistent with certain established criteria. Id.
The purpose of nutrient management plans is to educate farmers about the "proper
utilization and management of nutrients" on their farms and to "prevent the pollution of
surface water and ground water." Id. § 1702. While nutrient management plans are
mandatory for the largest agricultural operations, they remain voluntary for most
moderate- to small-sized operations. Id. § 1706(a). Nevertheless, the legislature wants to
"promote the development of voluntary plans." Id. § 1706(h).
77. Id. § 954.
78. One month after the comprehensive amendment to the right-to-farm law, the
legislature also amended the Agriculture-Linked Incentive Program, which relates to the
voluntary adoption of nutrient management plans. See Act of June 18, 1998, Pub. L. No.
696, No. 90, § 1. The Incentive Program offers low-interest loans to encourage farmers
to implement voluntary nutrient management plans. 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1722
(West 2005).
79. Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why
Legislative Efforts To Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 103, 105 (1998).
80. Id.
81. Id. Hamilton says that, as a result, right-to-farm laws are on "somewhat
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impose limitations on the degree of protection they provide to farmers.82
Others, however, impose
very few limitations and seek to protect farmers
83
as much as possible.
84
Therefore, there are generally two types of right-to-farm laws.
The first type ("Type One") provides a qualified immunity from nuisance
suits to any farming operation that has been in existence for a given
period of time. 85 These laws are essentially a codification of the
common law "coming to the nuisance" doctrine.8 6 The second type
("Type Two") provides an absolute immunity to all farming operations,
regardless of how long they have been in existence. 87 This type of law is
not connected to the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine, as the nonagricultural property owners who seek to sue may have been there before
their farming neighbors.8 8
Therefore, Type One is a more conservative law that provides
neighbors of agricultural operations with some remedy to prevent
nuisances. In contrast, Type Two causes a substantial shift in the balance
of property rights to
the farmer and away from the neighboring
89
residential occupants.
In 1998, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the state's right-to-farm
law was unconstitutional, 90 as a taking without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 9' Iowa's law is a Type Two law
dangerous ground." Id. Drafters of right-to-farm laws must carefully justify the need for
the special protection given to farmers and compose the legislative shield as "accurately
and narrowly" as possible. Id.
82. Id. at 106. Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law is an example as it requires farmers
to meet various criteria before they are entitled to nuisance immunity. See 3 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 954 (West 2005).
83. Id. at 106. Hamilton says that there is little equitable justification for the
expansion of right-to-farm laws, and that legislators must have "followed the maxim that
if one aspirin is good then perhaps two are better" when expanding the laws. Id. at 108.
Wisconsin's right-to-farm law is among the most protective. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 823.08 (West 2005). The law immunizes farmers from suit even if negligent
agricultural practices caused the nuisance. Id. In addition, the law contains no time
requirement and provides farmers with immunity from suit no matter how long the farm
has been in existence. Id.
84. See Christine H. Kellett, Understanding "Right to Farm'"Laws, Pennsylvania
State University, http://www.dsl.psu.edu/centers/aglawpubsIbomann2.cfn (last viewed
May 30, 2005) [hereinafter Kellett, Understanding].
85. Id.
86. See supra Part II-B for a discussion of the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine.
87. See Kellett, Understanding,supra note 84.
88. Id.
89. Laurent, Michigan'sRight to Farm, supra note 15, at 232.
90. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998).
91. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part
that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of... property without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
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because it precludes nuisance suits for all
farms regardless of the length
92
of time that they have been in operation.
Iowa's right-to-farm law was held unconstitutional in Bormann v.
Board of Supervisors,93 where neighbors of an agricultural operation
brought a facial challenge against the law. 94 The neighbors claimed that
the law deprived them of a "constitutionally protected private [property]
right" without the just compensation required by the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause.95 For purposes of the Takings Clause, property includes
"every sort of interest the citizen may possess" in relation to his land.96
The Iowa court held that when a nuisance suit is barred by a right-tofarm law, an easement 97 is created in the neighboring property in favor of
the farmer. 98 This is because the immunity from suit allows the farmer to
act on his land in a manner that would constitute a nuisance if not for the
easement. 99 Since easements are among the constitutionally protected
private property interests, the Iowa court held that the establishment of
an easement resulted in a taking.' 0 0
The Bormann decision was influenced by the fact that Iowa's rightto-farm law was Type Two.' 0 1 Because the statute did not require that a
farm be in operation before the arrival of neighboring landowners, the
balance of rights had shifted too much to the side of the farmer.'0 2 In
92. See IowA CODE ANN. § 352.1 l(l)(a) (West 2005). In Iowa, any farm operation
located in an agricultural area is immune from nuisance suit "regardless of the established
date of operation or expansion of the agricultural activities of the farm." Id. However,
immunity does not apply to a nuisance resulting from either: (1) a violation of a state or
federal law; (2) negligent operation of a farm; (3) injury caused prior to the creation of an
agricultural area; or (4) injury resulting from water pollution or excessive soil erosion.
Id. § 352.1 l(1)(b).
93. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 309.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 315. For the text of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, see supra note
91.
96. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). Property
rights include the right to possess, use, and dispose of property, and the right to exclude
others from it. Id.
97. An easement is an interest in land which "entitles the owner of the easement to
use or enjoy land in the possession of another." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 451 cmt. a
(1944). The easement may entitle its owner to act on his own land in a manner that
would constitute a nuisance if not for the easement. Id. Easements are included among
the property interests subject to the requirements of the Takings Clause. United States v.
Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910).
98. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316.
99. Id. See also Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. P'ship, 952 P.2d 610, 615 (Wash.
1998) (holding that Washington's right-to-farm law gave farmers a "quasi easement" to
continue their nuisance activities against neighboring urban developments).
100. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316.
101. For the drawbacks of a Type Two law, see supra note 89 and the accompanying
text.
102. Laurent, Michigan'sRight to Farm, supra note 15, at 232.
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essence,
the farmer was given an "unfair influence" over his neighbors'
10 3
land.

Pennsylvania's current right-to-farm law is an amalgam of both
Type One and Type Two laws. The law as it existed prior to the 1998
amendment 1°4 was entirely Type One, since it required an agricultural
operation to have been in existence for at least one year before it could
qualify for nuisance immunity.10 5 The Pennsylvania Superior Court
construed this portion of the state's law as a constitutional statute of
limitations in 1999.106 The court's determination was based on the fact
that neighboring landowners were not "absolutely prohibited" from filing
nuisance suits against their agricultural neighbors. 10 7 Instead, the
neighbors were provided with a reasonable statutory period in which to
rectify any complaints they may have had about any nuisance. 10 8 In
other words, Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law was upheld because it was
a Type One law that allowed non-agricultural landowners to retain a
109
reasonable remedy against nuisances.
Likewise, other states have found their Type One right-to-farm laws
to be constitutional. For example, in interpreting Minnesota's right-tofarm law, a federal district court held that Bormann"10 was inapplicable
because the Minnesota statute1 provided a two-year period in which 12a
nuisance lawsuit could be filed against a neighboring farmer.
Therefore, because Type One laws allow neighboring landowners to file
suit for the statutory period, no easement is created and no taking

103. Christine Kellett, Pennsylvania Right-to-Farm Protection Still Strong,
Pennsylvania State University, *2, http://aginfo.psu.edu/news/april99/right-to-farm.html
(last visited Nov. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Kellett, Pennsylvania].
104. See supra Part II-C for a discussion of the operation of the law prior to the
amendment.
105. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954(a) (West 2005).
106. Home v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). In Home, a
homeowner raised a nuisance challenge against a neighboring poultry business that had
been in operation for approximately two years. Id. The homeowner alleged that the flies,
odor, noise, and other waste (i.e. eggshells, feathers, and dead chickens) from the
business caused substantial depreciation in the value of his home. Id.
107. Id. at 956. Neighboring landowners could file nuisance suits if they proved that:
(a) the farm operation had been substantially changed in the previous year; or (b) the
agricultural landowner was acting in violation of local, state, or federal law. Id. at 957.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
111. The Minnesota right to farm law provides, in relevant part that, "An agricultural
operation is not and shall not become a private or public nuisance after two years from its
established date of operation if the operation was not a nuisance at its established date of
operation." MINN. STAT. § 561.19(2)(a) (West 2005).
112. Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of Comm'r, No. CIV.A.02-601, 2003 WL
21744235, at *7 (D. Minn. July 25, 2003).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:1

results. 13
The Type One line of cases implies that Pennsylvania's right-tofarm law is well-insulated against a takings challenge. However, the
1998 amendment to Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law may have made the
law more vulnerable."l 4 The amendment is Type Two, as it provides an
absolute bar against nuisance suits for qualifying operations regardless of
how long they have been in existence. 1 5 The constitutionality of this
portion of Pennsylvania's law has yet to be decided; however, the Iowa
court's decision to strike its Type Two law in Bormann suggests that the
law may be vulnerable. 1 6 Nevertheless, the political atmosphere in
Pennsylvania may shield the law from scrutiny. There is strong public
7
policy in Pennsylvania that favors the protection of agricultural land,"
and Pennsylvania's courts are often highly persuaded by the legislature's
statement of public policy." 8 In addition, Pennsylvania's right-to-farm
law is rarely used, which may reflect a tolerance for agriculture among
rural Pennsylvania's population.19
B. PotentialFlaws in the Iowa Court'sReasoning that its Right-toFarm Law Resulted in an UnconstitutionalTaking
Even if the Pennsylvania courts choose to reject the substantive
distinction between Type One and Type Two right-to-farm laws, they
could still decline to follow the Iowa Supreme Court's reasoning. While
120
some courts have adopted Bormann's reasoning,
several courts and
2
commentators have rejected it as flawed.' '
The framework for a "takings" analysis under the Fifth
Amendment 22 requires three separate inquiries. First, the reviewing

113.
114.

Id. at *8 (holding that Bormann's easement theory was inapplicable).
See supra Part II-D for a discussion of the amendment.
115. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954 (West 2005).
116. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998).
117. See, e.g., Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 452 A.2d 1337, 1343
(Pa. 1982) (holding that the preservation of agricultural land is an important government
goal).
118. Kellett, Understanding,supra note 84.
119. Kellett, Pennsylvania, supra note 103, at *2.
120. For example, an Idaho district court relied heavily upon Bormann to strike down
an Idaho nuisance and trespass immunity statute. Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, No.
CV 2002 3890, 2003 WL 21640506, at *1 (D. Idaho June 4, 2003). The statute at issue
in that case, which protected field burning in agricultural operations, was found to be a
violation of the Takings Clause of both the Idaho and United States Constitutions. Id.
121. See, e.g., Stephanie L. Dzur, Nuisance Immunity Provided by Iowa's Right-toFarm Statute: A Taking Without Just Compensation, National Agricultural Law Center,
http://www.NationalAgLawCenter.org (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Dzur,
Nuisance Immunity]. See also Laurent, Michigan'sRight to Farm, supra note 15, at 233.
122. For the text of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see supra note 91.
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court must determine whether there is a constitutionally protected private
property interest at stake. 23 Second, the court asks whether that private
1 24
property interest has been "taken" by the government for public use.
Third, if a property interest has been taken, the court asks if just
compensation has been paid to the owner. 25 Since it was clear in
Bormann that just compensation had not been paid, 126 the court analyzed
only the first and second of these issues. 127 First, the court attempted to
establish the existence of a constitutionally protected property interest by
128
drawing an analogy between nuisance immunity and easements.
However, this analogy is tenuous at best. Second, the Iowa court relied
on aper se takings theory. 29 Since the issues were simply not130that clearcut, the court should have relied on regulatory takings theory.
1. Right-to-Farm Laws Do Not Infringe a ConstitutionallyProtected Property Interest because Nuisance Immunity Does Not Create
an Easement
In an attempt to establish the existence of a constitutionallyprotected private property interest, the Iowa court equated the nuisance
immunity granted by right-to-farm laws with easements.' 3 ' The court
held that when a nuisance suit is barred by a right-to-farm law, an
easement is created in the neighboring property allowing the farmer to
act in a manner that would otherwise constitute a nuisance. 132 However,
immunities are very different in kind from easements. Immunities give
123. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1998).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 310.
127. Id. at 315-19.
128. Id. at 315.
129. Id. Two categories of state action constitute per se takings that must be
compensated. The first involves the permanent physical invasion of a property. Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982). The second denies a
property owner all economically beneficial use of his land. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
130. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). If
there is no per se taking, the court uses an ad hoc approach to determine if there has been
a regulatory taking. Id. The reasonableness of the taking is determined by balancing:
(1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation's interference with
investment backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action. Id.
131. For a definition of easement, see supra note 97. In contrast, the Washington
Supreme Court held that the right to maintain a nuisance was similar to, but not
equivalent to, an easement in Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Limited Partnership,952
P.2d 610, 615 (Wash. 1998). By characterizing the right created as a quasi-easement, the
Washington court avoided all of the legal implications that are inherent in using the term
easement. Dzur, Nuisance Immunity, supra note 121, at 9.
132. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1998).
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parties a "shield" against legal challenges. 33 Easements, however, are
not shields. Instead, they are concrete property interests which authorize
an individual to affirmatively use another individual's land.1 34 Nuisance
immunity does not authorize a farmer to enter upon or otherwise use his
neighbor's land. At most, nuisance immunity enhances the farmer's
right to use his own land. This is simply not enough to create an
easement. 135
In concluding that an easement had been created, the Bormann court
relied on a 100-year-old Iowa opinion wherein the defendant obtained an
easement to use the plaintiff's land by prescription after discharging soot
onto his land for the statutory period. 136 This case, Churchill v.
Burlington Water Company,' 37 simply reaffirms the doctrine of adverse
possession, which states that one property owner can obtain an interest in
38
the property of another after a period of open and notorious use.1
Churchill makes no remarks about nuisance immunity. 39 Nevertheless,
the Bormann court borrowed the term "easement" from Churchill, and
from the law of adverse possession, to conclude that the right to maintain
a nuisance created an easement. 140
The result is an improper
amalgamation of property doctrines.
Furthermore, defining nuisance immunity as an easement creates a
slippery slope whereby other essential property devices could be
classified as easements. Various statutes, such as pollution control
provisions and landmark laws, restrict an individual's right to use his
land and do so in favor of his neighbors and of the public good.' 4 1 In
fact, like right-to-farm laws, general zoning laws also burden the
property rights of regulated individuals. 42 If zoning were defined as
creating an easement, the state would be stripped of virtually all of its
43
power to regulate land use. 1

133. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1994) (immunizing federal employees from
common law tort actions).
134. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 451 cmt. a (1944).
135. Id. (including in the definition of an easement the requirement that a landowner
be entitled to "use or enjoy land in possession of another").
136. Churchill v. Burlington Water Co., 62 N.W. 646, 647 (Iowa 1895).
137. Id.
138. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (5th ed. 2002).
139. Churchill,62 N.W. at 646.
140. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1998).
141. Eric Pearson, Immunities as Easements as "Takings": Bormann v. Board of
Supervisors, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 53, 61 (1999) [hereinafter Pearson, Immunities].
142. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 971 (5th ed. 2002) (describing
permissible zoning restrictions).
143. See Boardman v. Davis, 3 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 1942) (holding that although
zoning ordinances often "lay an uncompensated burden" on property owners, they do not
"constitute an easement upon the property").
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The Bormann court's reasoning that nuisance immunity creates an
easement has also been criticized as a logically-flawed "zero sum
assumption."' 44 The court defined the property rights at issue by
reference to what was gained by the farmers protected by the right-tofarm statute. 45 The court should have, instead, assessed what damages
had actually resulted to those who had allegedly been injured by a taking
of their property without just compensation.1 46 According to one critic,
"[h]aving concluded that the defendants gained something, the court
perceived the plaintiffs to have lost precisely what the defendants gained.
What was given to one must have been taken from the other. But rights
can be enlarged for one person without diminishing or adversely
affecting rights of other persons.' 47 In fact, nuisance immunity merely
enhances an agricultural landowner's right to use his own land. It does
48
not burden the property rights of the neighboring landowners. 1
Finally, the Bormann court failed to consider the possibility that the
rights at issue were not rooted in property principles at all. While
property is a broad concept, not every conceivable interest is property. 49
The role of defining property interests is reserved for the states. 5 ° In
Iowa, as in many other states, nuisance is a component of tort law, not
property law. 15' The United States Supreme Court has held that rights in
52
tort are not interests in property protected by the Takings Clause.
Therefore, the regulation of rights arising in tort, such as a grant of
nuisance immunity under the right-to-farm law, does not constitute a
53
taking of property.

144. Pearson, Immunities, supra note 141, at 60-61.
145. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321.
146. Pearson, Immunities, supra note 141, at 60-61.
147. Id. at 76.
148. Pearson, Immunities, supra note 141, at 60-61 ("Rather than being the extraction
of a 'stick in the bundle' of property rights of plaintiffs, [nuisance immunity] is an
additional stick added to defendants' own bundle"). See also Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 236-37 (2003) (holding that when determining whether a taking has
resulted "the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained").
149. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (holding that a person's
interest in her own reputation is not property); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972) (holding that while employment can be property, a mere unilateral interest in
employment is not).
150. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)
("Property interests.., are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.").
151. See Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Iowa 1942). In an action
to recover damages for the intrusion of "foul, noxious, and nauseous gases and odors"
over private property, the court stated that "a private nuisance is a tort." Id. at 438.
152. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
153. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (stating that even
when regulations strip land of all of its value, they do not constitute a per se takings when
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2. The Iowa Court's Reliance on Per Se Takings Theory was
Unwarranted
In Bormann, there was a complete lack of evidence that a nuisance
15 4
actually resulted from the defendant's agricultural operation.
Therefore, the plaintiffs chose to bring a facial challenge alleging that
the right-to-farm statute resulted in an unconstitutional taking.'
The
United States Supreme Court has been extremely hesitant to find a taking
based upon a facial challenge to a statute. 56 Nevertheless, the Iowa
Supreme Court held that the state's right-to-farm law "appropriates
valuable private property interests and awards them to strangers."' 157 To
158
invalidate the law, the court relied on aperse takings analysis.
Two categories of state action constitute per se takings that must be
compensated. The first involves the permanent physical invasion of a
property. 9 The second involves regulations that deny the owner of a
property of all economically beneficial use of his land. 160 The Bormann
court restricted its discussion to the permanent physical invasion
category ofper se takings.'61
The permanent physical invasion category of per se takings is
162
derived from Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation.
An analysis of Loretto reveals that nuisance immunity is not what the
United States Supreme Court had in mind when it announced its per se
takings rule. In Loretto, the plaintiff had been forced by the government
to install communication equipment on his apartment building. 163 The
Supreme Court held that this permanent physical invasion of plaintiffs
building infringed upon his right to use his property and was a per se

they "no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved.., by adjacent
landowners.., under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally").
154. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Iowa 1998).
155. In a facial challenge, the statute itself is alleged to be unconstitutional. Dzur,
Nuisance Immunity, note 122, at 5. In contrast, an applied challenge is one in which the
statute's application to the challenger is alleged to be unconstitutional, even though the
statute may be constitutional on its face. Id.
156. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 471
(1987) (to establish a taking when making a facial challenge, one must show that a statute
"makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business, or that there
has been undue interference with investment backed expectations").
157. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 322.
158. Id. at 316.
159. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).
160. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
161. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 317-19.
162. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428.
163. Id. at 422.
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taking.164 Therefore, Loretto involved a true permanent physical
occupation of private property.' 65 The plaintiff in Loretto was
permanently ousted from occupying a portion of the physical space in his
apartment building. 166 This type of permanent physical occupation is not
created by right-to-farm laws. First, odors and noise are not permanent.
They vary by time of day, wind direction, and other factors. 167 Second,
neither odors nor noises oust a private property owner from physical
possession of his property. 168
The Loretto Court itself denied that intrusions of the type implicated
169
by right-to-farm laws could constitute permanent physical occupations.
This pronouncement was consistent with its belief that the Court had
"consistently distinguished between ...cases involving a permanent
physical occupation, on the one hand, and cases involving a more
temporary invasion, or government action outside the owner's property
that causes consequential damages within, on the other. A taking has
always been found only in the former situation."' 170 Clearly, right-tofarm laws involve government action outside the non-agricultural
landowner's property, typically on a neighboring farm. Even if this
activity causes consequential damages to the neighboring property, the
Court has clearly stated that this is not enough to constitute a per se
taking.171
Nevertheless, the Bormann 172 court attempted to demonstrate that
nuisance immunity could constitute a permanent physical occupation.' 7 3
Recognizing that nuisance-type conduct was not a trespass, 74 the court
attempted to show that non-trespassory invasions could still constitute a
per se taking. 17 It did so by citing to cases where a taking was found in
164. Id. at 438.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 434.
167. Pearson, Immunities, supra note 141, at 71.
168. Id.
169. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).
170. Id.
171. The Supreme Court has refused to extend Loretto to situations that go beyond
permanent physical occupations. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519
(1992). In Yee, the owner of a mobile home park alleged that a permanent physical
occupation resulted from rent control provisions that restrained his right to terminate
rentals. Id. at 525. The Court disagreed, holding that "the state and local laws at issue
here merely regulate petitioners' use of their land by regulating the relationship between
landlord and tenant." Id. at 528.
172. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
173. Id. at 317-19.
174. Id. at 315 (holding that, unlike a trespass, which "comprehends an actual
invasion [of land] by tangible matter," nuisance-like activities are usually accompanied
only by "intangible substances, such as noises and odors").
175. Id. at 318.
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the absence of an invasion of the surface of the land.1 76 Although there
were nuisance aspects to each of these cases, these aspects alone were
not the basis for the Court's finding that there was a taking in each
case. 177
Furthermore, the Bormann court's heavy reliance on the Supreme
Court's navigation cases 178 ignores the distinction between the "classic
right-of-way" easement179 and the navigation easement. 18 0 When a
classic right-of-way easement is created, it constitutes a permanent
physical occupation and thus a per se taking.18 1 However, when a
navigation easement of passage is created, it is not a permanent
occupation of land and therefore not a per se taking. 182 Instead, it is a
temporary taking subjected to a more complex regulatory takings
analysis to determine whether it constitutes a taking.' 83 Likewise, the
Bormann court should have subjected the right-to-farm law to a
regulatory takings analysis to determine whether a taking had resulted.
The Bormann court's reliance on Richards v. Washington Terminal
Company1 84 to demonstrate that permanent physical occupations do not
require physical touching is also misplaced. 185 In Richards, the
plaintiffs' residential property, located near a railroad tunnel, was
burdened by smoke and ash from the railroad. 186 Although the plaintiffs
recovered in Richards,187 they did so only because of their right to be free
176. The Takings Clause protects more than the owner's rights to the surface of his
land. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 165 (1979) (holding that a
private lagoon that had been dredged and connected to navigable waters is protected by
the Takings Clause); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (holding that the
low reaches of the atmosphere directly above the land are protected by the Takings
Clause); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that the mineral
estate is protected by the Takings Clause).
177. Trespass was still an indispensable ingredient of each case. For example, in
United States v. Causby, the low altitude of the overflights were within the property
owner's dominion and were thus considered trespasses. Causby, 338 U.S. at 267. See
also Portmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1922)
(holding that the government's action in firing military weapons repeatedly over
plaintiff's property was a trespass).
178. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 318.
179. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987).
180. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
181. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832. With a right-of-way easement, "individuals are given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station
himself permanently upon the premises." Id. This is enough to constitute a permanent
physical occupation. Id.
182. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
183. Id.
184. Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
185. Id. at 549.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 557-58.
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from the "special and peculiar damage" to their property that resulted
from a defective ventilation system in the tunnel. 188 The Richards Court
held that no taking had resulted from the normal operation of the railroad
because the government's decision to construct the railroad conferred
immunity on the railroad from this type of nuisance suit. 189 Therefore,
Richards actually stands for the proposition that government
may create
190
immunities without offending the Takings Clause.
3.
Even if Regulatory Takings Doctrine were Used to Determine
the Constitutionality of Right-to-Farm Laws, They Would Likely
Withstand Challenge.
Had Iowa's right-to-farm law been subjected to regulatory takings
analysis, it likely would have withstood constitutional challenge. 19 1 The
regulatory takings doctrine says that, even in the absence of a per se
taking, a regulation on the use of land may still constitute a taking in
some circumstances. 192 An ad hoc approach is used to determine if there
has been a regulatory taking. 193 The Court balances: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation's interference with
investment backed 194expectations; and (3) the character of the
governmental action.
Evaluated under this test, right-to-farm laws arguably do not result
in a taking. First, there is rarely evidence of any economic harm to nonagricultural property in right-to-farm cases. 195 Second, the character of
the government action with right-to-farm laws amounts only to a
"rational legislative attempt" to support an important industry. 196 In
other words, right-to-farm laws are merely regulatory in nature. The
United States Supreme Court has held that such important government
actions weigh against the finding of a taking. 197 Finally, there is often no
188. Id. at 557.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Pearson, Immunities, supra note 141, at 72-73.
191. This issue has never been litigated with respect to right-to-farm laws.
Laurent, Michigan'sRight to Farm,supra note 15, at 234.
192.

See
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1994) (discussing the evolution of the regulatory takings doctrine).
193. The first case to advance the doctrine was Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922).
194. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (holding
that New York's landmark law did not constitute a taking when applied to Grand Central
Station).
195. See, e.g., Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 311-12 (Iowa 1998).
In Bormann, there was no evidence of economic harm to the plaintiffs property. Id.
196. Laurent, Michigan'sRight to Farm, supra note 15, at 234.
197. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. In contrast, government actions that result in the
physical invasion of property are weighed in favor of a taking. Id.
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interference with investment-backed expectations in right-to-farm cases
' 98
because the non-agricultural neighbors have "come to the nuisance.'
The choice to live in an area dominated by fanning suggests that the
neighbors have considered the likelihood of odors and dust from farms
when arriving at their investment-backed expectations.' 99
IV. Conclusion
There is little doubt that Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law provides
valuable protection for agriculture. °° It offers a sense of security to
farmers and puts neighboring non-farm owners on notice that their rights
may be tempered by the rights of pre-existing farm operations.2 ° 1
Although Iowa's right-to-farm law failed to withstand constitutional
challenge, Pennsylvania's law is likely to be upheld.
Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law differs significantly in approach
from Iowa's law.
While Iowa's law was entirely Type Two,
Pennsylvania's law is predominantly Type One.
Therefore,
Pennsylvania's law vests the neighboring landowner with much greater
rights as against an agricultural neighbor than does Iowa's law.
Although the 1998 amendment to Pennsylvania's law is Type Two, the
legislative policy behind the law suggests that Pennsylvania courts would
be inclined to uphold it. Furthermore, even if the 1998 amendment
failed, the law's severability clause would allow the bulk of the law to
remain in effect.
In addition, the Bormann court's reasoning may contain some fatal
flaws which would make Pennsylvania courts less inclined to adopt it.
There is no constitutionally-protected private property interest at issue in
right-to-farm cases. Although the Bormann court attempted to establish
a protected interest by reference to easement law, the link between
nuisance immunity and easements is tenuous at best. Instead, nuisance
immunity is firmly rooted in tort law, and any flaws with right-to-farm
laws should be remedied using tort principles. In addition, right-to-farm
laws do not constitute a per se taking because they do not result in
permanent, physical occupations of neighboring land. At most, right-tofarm laws may create a regulatory taking, but even this is unlikely. Both
the legitimate public purpose behind right-to-farm laws and their limited
impact on the economic interests of non-agricultural property owners
198.

See supra Part I-B.

199. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321.
200. It is impossible to gauge just how many prospective legal actions are not filed
due to the existence of the law. See Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws
Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances
May be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103, 104 (1998).
201. See id.
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suggest that a regulatory takings claim could not be proven.
Nevertheless, farmers should consider taking steps to avoid
nuisance complaints in the future, especially if they are relying on the
Type Two portion of Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law for nuisance
immunity. Farmers should discuss their plans to spread manure or apply
chemicals with their neighbors and be candid with them about the
impacts that these activities may have on their properties.20 2 This will
allow neighboring property owners to prepare themselves to deal with
the inconvenience in advance. If neighboring property owners know that
a farmer is doing his best to protect their rights, mutual respect will be
fostered. Although right-to-farm laws are important, the agriculture
industry's ultimate goal should be to eliminate problems with nonagricultural property owners before they start. Educating these property
owners about the benefits and detriments of farming can help the
industry to achieve this goal.

202. Jeff Feirick, Farm Protection From Nuisance Lawsuits 4 (Penn State University
Agricultural Law Research and Education Center 2001).

